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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the telecom regulator, i.e., the National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA) in the telecom sector between January 1998 and March 2003. Indeed, 
during the years 1996-1998, major changes took place in the field of telecom regulation in all the 
member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and development (OECD), 
especially in the countries covered by our studies, i.e., Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, South 
Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. These changes were triggered by two 
major international telecom-related initiatives, namely the World Trade Organization (WTO) Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement and the European Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications, 
which became effective in 1998. In Switzerland, the Telecommunications Act (LTC) was enacted on 
January 1, 1998 and laid the basis for the telecommunication liberalization. In the European Union 
(EU), the Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications was designed in order to foster competition 
in the market and to harmonize policies in the different member states.1 In the United States, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 confirmed the principles already existing in the Communications Act 
of 1934 and introduced competition in the local market. In South Korea, the Telecommunications Acts 
of 1983 was amended in order to be compliant with the WTO Agreement. In Korea, the severe 
economic crisis of 1997, along with significant technological progress, furthermore pushed for 
liberalization and privatization.  
Such new legislations led to two main results, namely the set-up of new institutions in charge of 
telecom regulation – with the National regulatory Authority (NRA) at their center – and/or the 
definition of new public policy objectives, often translated into specific targets for the regulator. 
 
 Today, most countries are again partially, or sometimes even totally, revising their regulatory 
frameworks, and this as the combined result of technological changes and market evolution. Indeed, 
in a process of mutual stimulation, market evolution requires political intervention and in return, 
political intervention contributes to shaping the market. The EU's New Regulatory Framework, which 
will become effective in July 2003, is a typical example of how political intervention both responds to 
and guides the evolution of the telecom sector. In Switzerland too, the ongoing revision of the 
Telecommunications Law (LTC) demonstrates the necessity to adapt legislation in the light of new 
technological and economic challenges. After five to ten years of intensive liberalization and re-
regulation of the telecom sector, there is now an overall tendency to assess the results obtained 
through the actual institutional framework, and to adapt this framework to the rapidly evolving telecom 
sector. Consequently, most countries now undertake some sort of auto-evaluation of their telecom 
regulatory regime, hoping to come up with inspirations for designing the appropriate institutions for 
the years to come. 
 
The purpose of this report is precisely to respond to these needs for performance assessment by 
means of a comparative analysis. There currently exist very few studies, trying to systematically 
assess regulatory intervention when it comes to the telecommunications sector. There are, however, 
some very valuable reports, offering overviews of the sector and its regulation.2 Other publications 
                                                
1  This does not apply to the United Kingdom, which was considerably ahead of all other member states with regards 
telecom deregulation.  
2  World Bank (WB), Telecoms Regulation Handbook, 2000. 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Trends in telecommunication reform 2002: Effective regulation, 2002. 
  4 
 
 
 
 
assess telecom regulation, yet with very specific approaches, such as assessing the implementation 
of European legislation in the member countries,3 comparing regulation across sectors,4 or quite 
narrowly focusing on the NRAs and their resources.5 As mentioned above, this study seeks to link the 
outcomes of telecom regulation in selected countries to the corresponding institutional regulatory 
regimes.  
 
This is a synthesis of a larger research project done for the Swiss telecommunications regulator 
(OFCOM) including case studies carried out in the selected countries. This document is structured as 
follows: In the first chapter, we will present the conceptual framework underlying our study by 
including a short introduction on network industry regulation, a presentation of the objectives and the 
institutional design of telecom regulation and our approach to measure regulatory effectiveness. In 
the second chapter, we will analyze the results of our study, based on the information collected in our 
case studies. This should allow us to determine the outcomes achieved in each country and the 
impact of the regulators on these outcomes. Finally, we will provide the conclusions of our study; in 
particular explain the reasons why the impact of a regulator differs from one country to another.  
                                                                                                                                                                   
OECD, Telecommunications regulations: Institutional structures and responsibilities, 2000. 
3  So-called Implementation reports, available from the DG Information Society website. The last report (8th) was elaborated 
in December 2002.  
4  OECD, Reviews of Regulatory Reform per country. 
5  Jones Day Reavis & Pogue, Regulatory scorecard, 2002. 
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1 Conceptual model underlying our study 
 
Our analysis of telecom regulation is grounded in a solid theoretical model based on public policy 
considerations as applied to the network industries, of which telecommunications is typically one. 
Historically, network industries were what one may call sectorally ‘integrated industries’. This was 
particularly the case of telecommunications, postal services, public transport, air transport, electricity, 
gas, water distribution, and audiovisual. These industries were generally organized on a national level 
and if they were not totally integrated within the same enterprise, the professional nature of these 
industries would ensure that all concerned actors collaborated, nationally as well as internationally. 
Economically, these industries operated under what is called a “Cost+ regime”, thus paying primarily 
attention to the technical aspects and only secondarily to financial and/or customer considerations. 
These industries generally had more or less important public service objectives. These public service 
objectives were however not ensured by means of regulation, but mostly by means of public 
ownership and political control. With the process of liberalization of these industries, starting in the 
1980s and continuing in the 21st century, all these founding features of the network industries are 
questioned. More precisely, liberalization in these industries must be understood as a combination of 
unbundling – a primarily technical endeavor – and competition, whereby unbundling is a pre-requisite 
for competition. As a consequence, the formerly integrated industries are becoming fragmented and 
the different actors within the industry, which were previously cooperating, are now increasingly 
competing or otherwise behaving strategically. In light of all these challenges, sector regulation has 
been designed as a solution to accompany the liberalization of the network industries. Such sectoral 
regulation is most appropriately considered to be a public policy, given that in the end, regulation is 
always a form of governmental intervention. As such, state intervention must be rooted in public 
policy objectives, for which regulation, ultimately, is only the means but never an end in itself.  
 
In this section, we will first present the public policy objectives in the telecom sector, then outline 
the institutional arrangement set up in order to achieve these public policy objectives, and finally 
outline our research design aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of the telecom regulator. 
 
 
1.1 Telecom regulation as public policy 
 
In the telecommunications sector, one can generally distinguish between three types of public 
policy objectives, namely competition, public service, and systems integrity and innovation. Indeed, 
all liberal countries have one or several public policies pertaining to fair competition, anti-trust and 
more generally to the regulation of the market. Such competition regulation aims at promoting the 
public policy goals of national competitiveness and economic efficiency. Theoretically, market or 
competition regulation could simply be extended to the newly liberalized sectors. This is, however, 
rarely the case, as the liberalization of the network industries requires still additional and sector 
specific intervention. Indeed, in the formerly monopolistic network industries, markets and competition 
often first need to be created, thus promoting ’a-symmetric’ regulation by treating the incumbent less 
advantageously while favoring the competitors.  
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Another important public policy objective pertains to public services, such as in the case of 
regional and economic development, but also employment and security of supply. Historically, these 
public service objectives were implemented by means of ownership, but in the age of liberalization 
ownership turns out to no longer be an appropriate means to do so, considering in particular the fact 
that public service obligations can seriously handicap the historical operator and/or distort the market. 
Public services objectives thus also need to be regulated. Furthermore, and as a result of 
liberalization, a new form of public service has yet emerged, i.e. the protection of consumers. This 
form of public service includes what the broadly accepted terminology of the European Union calls 
‘Universal Service’, meaning the same treatment of all consumers across a given territory in terms of 
quality, access, and price. It can also comprise other forms of consumer protection, such as the 
provision of information to the consumers.   
 
A third area of regulation pertains to technical questions and as such is very sector specific, even 
though each sector does have technical questions to be regulated. In the telecommunications sector 
technical regulation pertains to spectrum allocation, sector integrity, and sector innovation. Indeed, in 
the age of liberalization, the use of the scarce resources (e.g., spectrum in the case of mobile 
telephony) can no longer be left to the decision of the historical operator and the scarce resources 
must be fairly – and technically satisfactorily – distributed among the various competitors in the 
market. Similarly, the integrity of the sector is at stake once the different operators start to behave 
strategically, as is the case in a liberalized environment. Sector regulators therefore need to set 
and/or enforce rules on interoperability or other industry standards. Similarly, it is sometimes said that 
sector regulators need to play a role when it comes to stimulating sector evolution and learning, as 
the strategic behavior of the different actors in the sector does not automatically lead to innovation. 
However, in our study we have not examined the effectiveness of the regulator when it comes to 
technical aspects, given the fact that they seem much less problematic, but also given the fact that 
we are not competent in this matter. 
 
 
1.2 Institutional arrangements  
 
The transition from public policy implementation by means of ownership to public policy 
implementation by means of regulation is also a process of profound institutional change, and as 
such difficult and politically controversial. As a matter of fact, the creation of regulatory (sectoral) 
authorities is one of the most spectacular outcomes of the new institutional configuration resulting 
from liberalization. Labeled as ‘National Regulatory Authorities’ NRAs or ‘regulators’, these new 
institutions are now in charge of regulating the recently liberalized sectors. The advent of independent 
regulators brings along a whole series of institutional and organizational issues, namely the issue of 
the independence of the regulator and its power relative to other actors. 
 
By definition, sector regulators are independent from the operators they are supposed to regulate. 
However, the term ‘independence’ is also used for the institutional separation between the regulator 
and the political authorities. Indeed, the general philosophy of the institutions promoting independent 
regulators (i.e., in particular the European Commission and the World Bank), is that regulators should 
also be an ‘arms-length’ away from government. This argument is particularly linked with the issue of 
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public ownership. But, although the ‘independent regulator’ model is the more frequently chosen 
option, many countries choose to set up political or administrative bodies, rather than more 
autonomous regulatory authorities. This issue of independence is in particular interesting for the 
questions of the nomination of the members of the regulatory bodies (Who nominates? For which 
period of time are regulators nominated?), reporting structures (To whom does the regulator report, 
i.e. to the government, the parliament or a special commission?), oversight mechanisms (Who 
oversees the regulator, i.e. parliament, the judiciary or yet another body?), and power. 
 
But, independence of the regulator is only one of two key elements to be considered, the other one 
being the regulator’s power. As a matter of fact, a regulator can be very independent, yet have little 
power. It is therefore important to consider the power attributes of the regulator, such as the legal 
attributes (Can the regulator decide on its own or simply recommend? Can the regulator investigate 
on its own or only act upon complaints? Can the regulator intervene ex-ante or ex-post? Does the 
regulator have to consult with other bodies, such as for example price surveillance before acting? 
etc.), the financial resources (What is its budget?), the human resources (What are its 
competencies?), as well as the financial autonomy (By whom is the regulator paid, i.e., the 
government, the consumers, the operators, or a combination thereof?). These attributes, together 
with the institutional tensions between the regulator and all other actors which are part of the larger 
institutional regulatory framework (e.g., competition regulator, the ministry, judicial authorities, 
regional regulatory authorities, price surveillance, etc.), ultimately determine whether the NRA 
theoretically can and practically does have an impact upon the outcomes. 
 
These two factors – i.e., independence and power – allow for a significant amount of variety 
between regulatory institutions in different countries. And indeed, it appears that regulatory 
institutions are closely related to the history and political tradition of a country (i.e., Anglo-Saxon 
tradition, German tradition, Scandinavian tradition and Latin tradition), as well as to the state system 
(centralism versus federalism). In the present study, the main focus is on the regulator and its 
characteristics as mentioned above. It must not be forgotten, however, that regulation is a multi-
dimensional process and that regulators are only one (key) element of a much larger system where 
multiple actors interact. The role of judicial and/or dispute settlement institutions, for instance, must 
also be carefully considered. In addition, the importance of consultative bodies (administrative or 
ministerial) and organized lobbies (consumer groups, unions) should be included into the wider 
analysis of the regulatory process. This process raises a series of institutional issues, which, from a 
theoretical point of view, all pertain to questions of inter-organizational relationships, control, and 
power. As we will see in chapter 2, the nature, the shape, the power, and the mission of the 
regulatory bodies and authorities vary significantly, thus considerably affecting the effectiveness of a 
sector regulator. 
 
 
1.3 Measuring the effectiveness of regulation and of the regulator 
 
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the main role of regulation is to ensure public policies 
objectives, once these objectives can no longer be implemented by means of public ownership. In our 
study, we will focus only on the objectives of competition promotion and public service provision, 
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leaving aside the technical objectives of spectrum allocation, system’s integrity, and innovation 
promotion. Five years after the full liberalization of the telecommunications sector, we now want to 
examine – in the case of eight countries – whether sector regulation has indeed promoted 
competition and ensured public services, and whether and to what extent this can be attributed to the 
work of the NRA in each country. Conclusions from such an evaluation shall help the legislators 
design new policies and regulatory frameworks and/or adapt existing ones. 
 
More precisely, our study wants to answer the following three questions: 
 
• To what extent have the original public policy objectives in the telecommunications sector been 
achieved? 
• To what extent can these outcomes be attributed to the regulatory institutional framework as 
opposed to external factors, beyond the control of the NRA and other institutional regulatory 
actors (e.g., economic growth or technological innovation)? 
• Wherever the role of the external factors is small, to what extent, then, can the outcomes of the 
regulatory framework be attributed to the specific actions of the sector regulator, i.e., the 
NRA? 
 
Assessing such regulatory effectiveness is a necessary and important task, yet not an easy one. It 
presupposes that targets are/were set beforehand and that it is possible to compare the outcomes 
against these targets. Evaluators thus need a set of pre-defined performance indicators that give 
clear indications about the actual results yielded by a regulatory institutional regime, and, in the case 
of the present study, that make it possible to isolate the particular role played by the independent 
regulator. Also, it must be recalled that outcomes are always related to public policy objectives, 
meaning that it might precisely be an objective not to regulate some of the outcomes, as we will see 
below.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the main objectives of telecom regulation are, in our view, related to 
competition and public service. We have subdivided these two objectives in a series of measurable 
indicators that should make it possible to determine whether objectives have been reached or not.  
 
Competition 
 
There are many ways to measure the degree of competition in a specific market. For our study, we 
have selected the following four generally accepted indicators: 
 
• Number of operators in the market: The number of competitors in the market and the 
evolution of this number are a manifest sign of the existence of competition. A market in which 
market conditions are equally favorable to all competitors (which is not true in the first years of 
telecom liberalization) attracts more companies who invest, lease lines, and produce.  
 
• Market shares of the incumbent: From the beginning of liberalization the market shares of the 
incumbent have been considered as a major indicator for competition in the telecom market. 
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Given the asymmetric nature of regulation, it is indeed important that the incumbent's market 
shares decrease in favor of the newcomers.  
 
• Choice for the consumers in terms of technologies/operators: One of the goals of 
liberalization is to increase choices for the consumers. It is important to monitor this and to 
make sure that consumers can effectively choose between different operators and between 
different technologies for each service.  
 
• End-user prices: Price-drops are viewed as the most successful outcome of market 
liberalization and are a result of competition between operators, sometimes sustained by 
regulatory intervention. The extent to which prices have dropped and their evolution over time 
are therefore considered as important indicators of competition and successful liberalization.  
 
Public service 
 
There are several conceptions of public service. In this study, we decided to take a broad definition 
of public service, including not only Universal Service,6 but also a good availability and quality of 
services, as well as the provision of relevant information to the consumers. As far as universal service 
is concerned, we have looked into its provision for each country, but we will not discuss this issue in 
the present summary, as differences between countries are minimal.  
 
We have thus selected the following three indicators helping us to determine to what degree public 
service objectives are met: 
 
• Availability of services: The availability of services refers not only to the provision of so-called 
universal services, but it also includes the variety and geographical coverage of all 
telecommunications services. When questioning the availability of services, we want to 
answers the questions: How advanced and widespread is the rollout of varied and modern 
technologies in the country?  
 
• Quality of services throughout the country: Quality of service remains a priority in most 
OECD countries, and this despite the increased reliance on market forces in the 
telecommunications sector (ITU, 2002). Quality monitoring means that there is a political will to 
make sure that consumers, although offered various products, can still count on a minimum 
quality level. Throughout our case studies, we will see to which extent regulators are 
concerned with this aspect of liberalization and what they do to ensure quality of services.  
 
• Information to the public: Information to the public is an important part of public service, as it 
protects the consumer from abuses and at the same time, enhances the advantages that a 
consumer can derive from market liberalization. Indeed, liberalization leads to the 
mushrooming of new products, offers and features, which makes it often difficult for the 
                                                
6  Universal service is a widely accepted concept that defines a certain number of telecommunications-related services 
considered as essential for the physical, economical, and social wellbeing of all inhabitants of a given territory and that 
should be made available irrespective of the profit or loss that they may occur.  
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consumers to know about the opportunities that are offered to them, to understand the 
differences between offers, and to know their rights vis-à-vis the multitude of 
telecommunication operators in the market. The scope, quality, and delivery of information, 
therefore, have to be considered as an outcome of regulation, on which, as we will see, the 
regulator has an important impact.  
 
To recall, regulatory regimes should indeed have been set up in a way that regulation produces 
the desired outputs, which in turn should lead to the planned outcomes. For instance, if the creation 
of competition is a policy objective, the regulation of interconnection prices, especially for incumbent 
operators, is one of the means for achieving the objective (or outcome), and this by means of 
impacting upon the incumbent. In other words, the output (e.g., decision) of the regulator impacts 
upon the incumbent, which in turn should lead to the desired outcome (e.g., more competition). 
However, it seems a little naive to believe in the perfect causality of sector regulation. First of all, it is 
not always clear which institutional arrangement is optimal in order to achieve the desired objectives. 
Secondly, it may be that some actors within the institutional regulatory framework are more effective 
than others, that the action of one of the actors is blocked by another one, that actors have 
overlapping competencies, or that some regulatory functions have not been assigned to anyone 
within the framework. No matter how good, strong, coherent, or sensible the regulatory framework, 
there are still a number of uncontrollable factors (such as consumer behavior or stock markets in the 
telecom sector), on which regulatory intervention has little or no impact.   
 
For the purpose of this study, we will assume that the regulator has a crucial role to play in the 
achievement of telecom policy objectives in the areas of competition promotion and public service 
provision. As the most competent body in the sector and the main institution in charge of telecom 
regulation, we will assume that the intervention of the regulator is necessary, determinant, and 
unlimited in time. Regulatory performance refers to the effectiveness of the regulator, that is, the 
ability of the regulator to achieve its goals. Performance also refers to the impact of the regulator, i.e. 
the degree to which the regulator’s action contributes to achieving the public policies objectives. Both 
are studied in this report. However, we will not study regulatory efficiency, i.e. the regulator’s usage of 
resources for achieving objectives. By seeking to determine the performance of the regulator, we will 
have to take into consideration the means, powers, and competencies of the regulator within the 
larger institutional framework in which it operates. 
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2  Analysis  
 
In this chapter, we will use the key findings of our different case studies in order to answer our four 
main research questions. In other words, we will 
 
• evaluate the outcomes achieved by means of the existing regulatory framework, i.e., compare 
outcomes with initial public policy objectives; 
• evaluate the relative importance of sector regulation over other, contextual factors 
• evaluate the impact of the regulator in achieving the outcomes; and 
• assess the relevance of the institutional framework, when it comes to achieving the outcomes, 
as well as when it comes to the work of the regulator. 
 
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part we carry out an analysis according to the 
indicators of competition and public service that have been predefined. For each indicator, we will 
discuss the three first points mentioned above, that is: look at the outcome in each country, evaluate 
the relative importance of regulation and external factors for each indicator and evaluate the impact of 
the regulator on the outcome. The external factors determining the impact of the regulator taken into 
consideration are by definition beyond its control. Such factors are, for example, the overall economic 
climate, technological developments (at least to a large extent, even though they may be affected by 
national research and development, as well as technology policy), consumer behavior, and 
topography. These factors do not constitute an object of our study and are thus not discussed in 
detail. In the second part, we will discuss the institutional arrangements for each country, and weigh 
up their implications on the effectiveness of regulation.  
 
 
2.1 Outcomes and relative impact of regulatory intervention and external factors on 
competition indicators 
 
In each country, there is a legislation that sets the objectives of telecom regulation and defines, to 
a certain extent, the outcomes to achieve. Even though the different countries have the same general 
objectives of competition and public service, it may be, and is indeed so, that the outcomes are 
slightly different from one country to another. In the paragraphs below, we will present the outcomes 
of telecom regulation in the different countries, by keeping in mind that objectives might have been 
different from one country to another to begin with.  
 
In spite of broad and continuous efforts over the past years, all specialists agree that measuring 
and comparing outcomes in the telecommunications sector has proven to be a very difficult task. 
Indeed, there is not a single source of information that provides sufficiently reliable data in order to get 
an accurate picture of the advancement of telecommunications liberalization across time and across 
countries. Because of obvious practical reasons, one can only grasp specific aspects of the whole 
picture, by relying on a few specific indicators. The efforts made by the OECD in its Communications 
Outlook and the European Union with the Implementation Reports should certainly not be 
underestimated. Both documents aim at providing a relatively comprehensive picture of the state of 
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advancement of liberalization in Europe and the OECD countries. However, statistics are rapidly 
outdated in the telecom sector, and not always comparable from one country to another.  
 
While attempting to collect statistical data in the countries covered by our studies, we encountered 
the same difficulties. Some countries have precise and regularly updated information about their 
telecom sector, whereas others do not, for a whole series of reasons. Indicators are not always 
measured the same way, and very often, countries tend to put forward essentially those statistics that 
advantage them most. 
 
As in the context of our cases studies we conducted interviews with actors of the sector, we have 
also gathered quite a bit of subjective information translating the perception the different actors have 
of the situation in their own country.  We believe that this kind of information, even if disputable from a 
methodological point of view, should nevertheless be valued in the context of this study, as 
perceptions also translate, shape, and change policy objectives and priorities within the country.  
 
Keeping in mind the above remarks, the outcomes in the different countries for each indicator are 
as follows:    
 
 
2.1.1 Number of operators 
 
In all countries observed, there has been an increase in the number of operators offering 
communication services over the past 5 years. Although it not impossible to know how many 
licensees there are in each country (except in Denmark maybe, where there is no obligation to 
announce), this still says little about the different types of licensees and the evolution of their number 
over time. Most countries have witnessed a tendency towards concentration after the burst of the ICT 
bubble, but not enough to speak of a real danger for competition. If we rely on the data displayed in 
the OECD’s Communications Outlook 2003 regarding the number of operators in service for each one 
of our countries,7 we see that the number of operators per million of inhabitants8 is especially high in 
Switzerland (more than 30 operators per million inhabitants), Austria (13.5/mio), the USA (9.8/mio) 
and Denmark (7.9/mio). Germany comes next with 7.3 operators per million inhabitants, followed by 
the UK (4.1/mio) and France (1.9/mio). Korea ranks last on the list with only 0.5 operators per million 
of inhabitants, i.e., 60 times less operators per inhabitant as in Switzerland.  
  
                                                
7 OECD, Communications Outlook 2003, p. 35 
8 As reference, we took the population statistics given in our case studies.  
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Let us now weigh the respective importance of the regulator’s intervention and the external 
factors. As far as the regulator is concerned, we can make a list of actions that the regulator can 
perform and that may have a certain impact upon the outcomes:  
 
Intervention of the regulator on the number of operators  
? Facilitate licensing procedures 
? Control unfair practices by the Incumbent that penalize new entrants 
? Promote the introduction of features favoring competition (CbC9, CPS10, ULL11, NP12) 
? Promote low interconnection tariffs 
? Make rapid decisions to improve legal and planning certainty 
 
The regulator has intervention power in creating a fair, stable, and simplified market environment. 
For instance, low licensing requirements encourage small companies to launch their activities in the 
market when at the same time; comparatively low interconnection charges further encourage the 
deployment of activities. On the other hand, licensing procedures that are tiresome and expensive 
tend to discourage companies from setting up activities in the country. Another essential activity of 
the regulator is to take timely decisions and intervene rapidly against unfair practices (e.g. price 
dumping, unfair marketing practices, non-compliance with obligations falling on operators with 
Significant Market Power - SMP), something which de facto evicts competitors from the market. The 
early introduction of features such as ULL, CPS, CbC, and NP also has a positive impact on the 
attractiveness of a market, and thus the number of operators. It is the task of the regulator to promote 
the introduction of such features and if the legislation does not allow it, to make sure that the 
legislation gets adapted consequently. 
 
We could conclude from the above that the Swiss, the Austrian, the American, and the Danish 
regulators fulfill their tasks best, whereas the Korean regulator performs rather badly for this specific 
indicator.  
 
Then again, we must not forget that it is the general legislative framework that sets the conditions 
of work for the regulator, and this explains why, for instance, the Korean regulator performs badly on 
the licensing procedures. Korean law simply does not favor easy licensing procedures, mainly for 
reasons of protecting domestic companies. Reciprocally, the Swiss legislation has very light licensing 
requirements, as does the Danish and the American legislation. In Switzerland however, it is not 
proven that the regulator exerts very tight control on the Incumbent, or that it promotes low 
                                                
9  Call-by-call carrier selection is a service enabling a telephone subscriber to select a carrier for individual calls, 
irrespective of whether the carrier is the provider of the local loop by dialing specific digits. 
10  Carrier pre-selection is a service enabling a telephone subscriber to select a carrier for all calls or for certain categories 
of calls (e.g., international and/or long-distance), irrespective of whether the carrier is the provider of the local loop, 
without having to dial specific digits. 
11  Unbundling of the local loop is a service whereby a telecom organization grants access to its local loop to another 
telecom organization. 
12  Number Portability is the ability for a customer to transfer its service account from one operator to another without 
requiring a change of the customer's number. 
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interconnection tariffs. Only the Danish regulator could be considered as fulfilling the majority of the 
actions listed above, but then Denmark comes only fourth in terms of number of operators.   
 
Therefore, we believe that the impact of the regulator’s work is not negligible on the final outcome, 
but that there are also other factors that have a major importance for the final result. If we look at the 
countries observed, the following external factors seem to have some influence:  
 
External factors affecting the number of operators  
? General business conditions in the country 
? National economic climate 
? Date of liberalization 
? Size of the country 
? Purchasing power 
? Openness to foreign investments 
 
The good outcomes in countries such as Switzerland, Denmark and Austria seem to result from a 
combination of factors such as the small size of the country (offering an adequate critical mass for 
telecommunication operators), as well as high purchasing power and generally favorable business 
conditions, all factors which also apply to the United States. Openness of the market to foreign 
investments is also a factor with a positive effect on the number of operators, and early liberalization 
in the United States could be yet another explanatory factor for its good position.  
 
All in all, it seems that the external factors mentioned above have a preponderant importance on 
the number of operators, and that there is no strong link between regulatory intervention and the 
number of operators.    
 
 
2.1.2 Market shares of the Incumbent 
 
After the liberalization of the market, a decrease in the market shares of the Incumbent is 
considered as an indicator of competition, and is often used to show evolution over time and to carry 
out international comparison.  
 
For several reasons, it is a difficult enterprise to make statements about the market shares of the 
Incumbent, and the supposed progress of competition that is linked to it. First of all, in some 
countries, operators are not requested to make their market shares public (Austria and Switzerland) 
with the result that the regulator and other bodies involved in telecom regulation have difficulties to 
know the respective positions of the different actors on the market. Secondly, market shares are 
sometimes expressed in number of subscribers, sometimes in the amount of call minutes and 
sometimes in revenue. Another difficulty is linked to the fact that a ‘small’ market share of the 
Incumbent could ‘hide’ a duopoly situation, which is not how effective competition is generally 
understood. Market shares also evolve quite rapidly, either in favor or at the detriment of the 
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Incumbent, which is why the available data (market shares of the year 2001 – Communications 
Outlook 2003) could well be misleading. We must therefore be prudent with the interpretation of the 
incumbent’s market shares as a sign of competition. We also attempted to collect more recent 
information, but realized that information was not always available and also that different sources 
sometimes gave different results. In the end, we will use a combination of the information provided by 
the OECD and the data that we have, as it is more recent (mid-2002). Unless mentioned otherwise, 
market shares are expressed in call minutes. Once all these difficulties are acknowledged, the 
question remains as to whether it is possible to compare the market shares of the Incumbent in each 
of our countries and draw conclusion from it. We will attempt to do so, by keeping in mind the remarks 
above.  
 
As far as market shares are concerned, the record is mixed in all of our countries, at least with 
regards to certain market segments. When we look at fixed telephony, a distinction has to be made 
between international telephony and domestic long-distance (DLD) telephony on the one hand, and 
local telephony and subscriber lines on the other hand. In the first two categories, a certain degree of 
competition has been reached, both in countries with early liberalization (e.g., United Kingdom, United 
States in the early '80s) and in countries where competition in the fixed telephony market was 
introduced only in the late ‘90s (e.g., EU countries, Switzerland and South Korea). Competition in 
these two markets is mainly due to the introduction of CPS and CbC, as well as due to the 
mushrooming of international calling cards. The market shares of the competitors in the international 
telephony market average from 26% to 55% for ‘late’ liberalizers and are as high as 67.5% in the case 
of the United States. In the long-distance fixed telephony market, the market shares of the 
competitors are mostly comprised between 15% (Korea - in revenue) and 40% but there are 2 
exceptions: the United States with 65.2 % in 2000, as well as Austria with 54.7 % in 2001.13   
 
Competition in the local telephony market is a completely different issue. The local market 
comprises subscriber lines and the one hand and the traffic considered as local on the other hand. 
Evidence shows that it is much harder for competitors to conquer market shares in that segment. 
Generally speaking, the incumbent still has a very high market share of local subscriber lines 
(because unbundling has only recently started) and a smaller share if we consider traffic (which in 
turn is essentially the result of carrier-selection). If we look at the market shares of competitors for 
subscriber lines, we note that the United Kingdom leads by far with 19.8% of subscriber lines in 
2001, essentially due to the success of cable telephony. Denmark follows with 12%, and the United 
States and Austria with 10% and 7% respectively in 2001.14 In all four other countries, competitors 
own less than 5% of the subscriber lines in 2002 (Korea 4%; Germany 3%; France 0.5% in 2001 and 
Switzerland with less than 0.1%). As for local traffic, results are quite heterogeneous from on country 
to another. Unfortunately, we do not have any information for Austria for this market segment. In the 
other countries, competition in the local calls market has made headway in Denmark, Switzerland and 
the UK with respective market shares of 35%,15 28%, and 27.4% for mid-2002. France and the United 
                                                
13 References from OECD, Communications Outlook 2003. 
14 All references of 2001 from OECD, Communications Outlook 2003.  
15 It is important to note that there is no distinction made in Denmark between local and long-distance calls.  
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States are still lagging behind with respective market shares of 14.6%16 and 9.8%.17 In Germany and 
Korea, the competitor’s market shares are still below 5%, as local call carrier selection was not 
introduced yet.  
 
As far as competition in the mobile market is concerned, market shares are much more equally 
distributed among operators than in the fixed market. Incumbents have market shares ranging from 
65% (e.g., Switzerland) to 40% (e.g. Denmark and Germany). Regulatory intervention in these 
markets is much less intensive in most of the countries observed, as the initial situation of the different 
market players is very different from the situation in the fixed market, where the incumbent had or still 
has a major infrastructure advantage.  
 
As for the Internet market, a distinction has to be made between dial-up Internet and broadband 
connections. In the dial-up market segment, competitors have succeeded in gaining important market 
shares, here again, mainly because of carrier-selection. For dial-up Internet we have market shares 
for only 3 countries namely Denmark, France and Switzerland. In all three countries the market 
shares of the competitors approach 2/3 of the market. In the ADSL market on the other hand, the 
market shares of the competitors are much smaller at least for a majority of the countries observed. 
As ADSL services require a new connection, market power on the subscriber line market are often 
leveraged into the ADSL market. This is true for Germany, with a meager 3% market share for the 
competitors, France with a 10 % market share, Austria with 13% and Denmark with a 21% market 
share for competitors, down from over 60% in January 2001. In Switzerland and Korea however, 
competitors have market shares in the ADSL market corresponding to 44% and 54.2% respectively in 
mid-2002.  
 
The following rankings summarize the comments above and classifies the countries according to 
the loss of market shares of the incumbent, in decreasing order:   
 
DLD and internat. Subscriber lines Local traffic Internet ADSL 
1. United States 1. UK 1. Denmark 1. Korea 
2. UK 2. Denmark 2. Switzerland 2. Switzerland 
3. Denmark 3. USA 3. UK 3. Denmark 
4. Austria 4. Austria 4. USA  4. Austria 
5.Switzerland 5. Korea 5. France  5. France 
6. France 6. Germany 6. Germany  6. Germany 
7. Germany  7. France 7. Korea  7. n.d. 
8. Korea 8. Switzerland 8. n.d. 8. n.d. 
 
All in all, if we attempt to classify the countries according to the incumbent’s loss of market shares 
in the four market segments mentioned above, we find the UK, Denmark, the USA, Austria, 
Switzerland, Korea, France and finally Germany.  
 
                                                
16 August 2002 in 8th Implementation Report – Annex 1, European Commission, December 3, 2002 
17 FCC, Telephone Trends 2002, page 9-9.  
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Let us now weigh the respective importance of the regulator’s intervention and of the external 
factors. As far as the regulator is concerned, the actions that the regulator can perform and that may 
have a certain impact upon the outcomes are:  
 
Intervention of the regulator on the market shares 
? Promote the introduction of features favoring competition (CbC, CPS, ULL, NP) 
? Control unfair practices by the incumbent (to avoid competitors from losing market 
shares) 
? Exert strong asymmetric regulation (fines for non-compliance, investigation if 
tendency towards monopoly) 
? Exert surveillance of incumbent's compliance with the provision of pre-products 
(prices, timeframes, quality, time of response) 
? Provide information about prices to customers 
 
The regulator has intervention power in creating good conditions for the new entrants on the 
market; in particular regulate third party access on the incumbent’s fixed network. Carrier selection 
and unbundling are two important requirements in this respect. Competition at the service level, by 
the introduction of CPS and CbC, produces the most convincing results so far, especially for long-
distance and international telephony, as well as dial-up internet. Unbundling on the other hand aims 
at creating long-term effective competition by giving new entrants direct access to the customer. The 
introduction of these features is planned by law, of course, but the regulator still has a role to play. 
After all, the regulator may dictate the agenda of implementation and exert surveillance on the 
compliance of deadlines and conditions. Besides, surveillance in a more general sense is a major 
task of the regulator when it comes to creating viable conditions for new operators on the 
telecommunications market. Another regulatory intervention that might have an (indirect) impact on 
the market shares of the competitors is the provision of relevant information to the consumers, either 
related to new services or to prices.   
  
The question as to whether the impact of the regulator is determining for the market shares of the 
competitors must be analyzed in light of the empirical evidence of our case studies and the results 
mentioned above. The UK, Denmark and the United States are, according to our calculations, the 
countries where competitors’ market shares are the highest. Thus the question: is it so that the 
corresponding regulators intervene more in these countries than in the others? We could say so for 
Denmark, and to a lesser extent for the UK and the USA. For these two cases, early liberalization 
seems to be a better explanatory factor. However, if we compare Denmark to other countries where 
liberalization occurred in the late ’90, it shows that regulatory intervention has an impact on the 
market shares of the competitors. A clear and audacious policy of third party access and information 
about new offers and prices to the consumers seem to bring about positive results for the newcomers 
on the market. Reversely, in countries where market shares of the incumbent are still comparably 
high, as in Korea, France and Germany, regulatory intervention is very different.  In South Korea, the 
regulator (ministry) is not so much concerned with the actual state of competition, as it is with the 
rapid and broad deployment of technologies. Clearly, in South Korea the promotion of competition is 
not the regulator’s first priority. In France and Germany on the other hand, competition is a priority but 
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it seems that the regulator has a rather passive attitude, and is reportedly light-handed on the 
incumbent.  
  
This raises the question about the ownership of the incumbent: indeed one could put forward total 
privatization18 of the incumbent as an explanatory factor for the incumbents’ lower market shares.  In 
countries where the incumbent is totally privatized, its market shares are indeed lower (in the case of 
Korea, this rule does not yet apply, because the incumbent was privatized only in 2002). In France 
and Germany on the other hand, state-ownership would be an explanatory factor for higher market 
shares of the incumbent.  
 
Austria and Switzerland are two cases that do not fit into any of the explanations above. Indeed 
both are ‘late’ liberalizers, with partly state-owned incumbents, and not particularly active regulators, 
at least with respect to this indicator. However, both countries rank in the upper middle of our list, 
indicating that the incumbents’ market shares have significantly decreased over the past years. In 
comparison to France and Germany, this could lead to think that the regulator is less complaisant vis-
à-vis the incumbent or that the attachment of the Swiss and Austrian consumer to their incumbent is 
less important. Moreover, Swiss and Austrian consumers also seem to be better informed about and 
make more extensive use of carrier-selection, as our case studies have shown.  
 
All in all, decreasing market shares of the incumbent seem to be attributable to a combination of 
regulatory intervention, especially the rapid introduction and implementation of carrier-selection and to 
external factors such as early liberalization and possibly also total privatization of the incumbent as 
well as consumers’ attachment to the historical operator.  
 
External factors affecting market shares 
? Early liberalization 
? Total privatization 
? Customer loyalty to the incumbent 
 
 
2.1.3 Choice for the consumers 
 
Choice is one of the main goals of liberalization, as competition should bring about more varied 
products and services for the consumers. In particular, for a given service, the consumer is expected 
to have the choice between several operators but also, and more and more, between different 
competing technologies. Initially, we wanted to look into both aspects, but we had to renounce 
because there exist very little information about the choice in terms of technologies. As a result, we 
only considered choice between operators for which a limited amount of data is available.   
 
                                                
18  Incumbents are totally privatized in Denmark, in the United States (nation-wide operators), in the United Kingdom and in 
Korea.   
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Even though the objective is clearly an important one for all our countries, the systematic 
monitoring of choice is deficient in most cases. In order to measure choice between operators, we 
have chosen to take into account the number of mobile operators19 as well as the percentage of 
population that can choose between 5 or more operators for local as well as long-distance and 
international fixed telephony.20 This figure however does not indicate precisely how many more than 5 
operators are available, nor if these operators offer different technologies.  
 
Choice for the consumer 
 A DK F D SK CH UK USA 
Mobile 4 6 3 4 4 4 4 5(80%)21
Local >5(95%) >5(95%) >5 >2(33% ) n.d. >5 >5 n.d.  
DLD and 
international 
>5(95%) >5(95%) >5 >5(95%) n.d. >5 >5 n.d. 
  
As we can see, there are no significant differences from one country to another, except in 
Germany, where choice for local telephony is reduced because carrier selection has not been 
introduced yet. In all other countries, consumers have a fair choice of operators for each service. 
Unfortunately, we have no information about the choice for consumer for Internet services, but this 
market segment is known as the one where the choice is broadest.   
 
If we list the different actions a regulator can undertake in order to advance the choices for 
consumers, we find: 
 
Intervention of the regulator on the choice for the consumers 
? Promote the introduction of features favoring competition (CbC, CPS, ULL, NP)  
? Stimulate competition between operators  
? Stimulate the deployment of different technologies for a given service 
? Inform the public about available features and services 
 
As far as choice between operators is concerned, the impact of the regulator on this indicator is 
closely linked to its responsibility and capability to introduce and to maintain competition in the 
telecommunications market. By stimulating competition within a given market segment (market 
surveillance, detection of unfair practices, investigation, rapid intervention, use of sanctions), the 
regulator contributes to ensuring a certain amount of choices for the consumer. Choice between 
different technologies can be stimulated by monitoring the variety of technologies available, ensuring 
                                                
19  As recorded in the OECD Communications Outlook 2003, pp. 35 and 40 
20  As recorded in WIK, Auszug aus dem 8. Implementation Report der EU – erweitert um die Schweiz, 2003. Figures not 
available for Korea and for the United States.  
21  In brackets, the percentage of the population that has the choice between the given number of operators 
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the safety of investments (by providing planning and legal certainty), and promoting the deployment of 
alternative technologies for a given service. Finally, the regulator can inform the consumers more or 
less about different technologies available. This is the case in Denmark, for instance, whereas in most 
other European countries the responsibility for promoting new technological features is left to the 
operators themselves. Of course, the regulator's action is limited by government policies and by the 
extent to which the regulator can make propositions, suggest legal changes and can intervene as an 
expertise body on future telecom policies in a given country. External factors, such as difficult 
topographies or variable population density (such as in Austria and Switzerland, for instance), also 
impact upon choice the consumers can benefit from, as does the general economic climate in the 
country.  
 
External factors affecting choice for the consumers 
? Topography and population density  
? Economic climate 
 
All in all, we can say that regulatory intervention is essential to the increase of choice for the 
consumers, but this intervention is highly dependent upon the legal framework underpinning the 
regulator’s action. Indeed, creating long-lasting conditions for effective competition is the most 
important action a regulator can perform to ensure choice for the consumers, but it is the legal 
framework that delimits the power of the regulator in this respect. This is also true for the introduction 
of carrier-selection, as well as the encouragement of intermodal competition as a guarantee for long-
lasting competition.   
 
 
2.1.4 End-user prices 
 
For all of the countries observed, it is undeniable that prices have decreased since the introduction 
of competition in the sector, especially for international fixed telephony, where competition is fierce. 
The extent to which prices have dropped is quite particular to each country. In order to discuss price 
differences, we have chosen to compare our 8 countries according to the ranking made by the OECD 
for some market segments22 and to class them according to a global price index elaborated as the 
combination of the different market segments.  
 
                                                
22  All references in OECD, Communications Outlook, pp. 158, 159, 162, 163-165 and 187 
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For the purpose of comparison, we took into consideration the prices for fixed telephony, Internet, 
Mobile telephony and leased lines. According to these data, our 8 countries are ranked as follows, 
from the cheapest to the most expensive country:  
 
Fixed telephony23 Internet24 Mobile telephony25 Leased lines26 
1. Switzerland 1. Korea 1. Denmark 1. Denmark 
2. UK 2. France 2. USA 2. Switzerland 
3. Denmark 3. UK and USA 3. France 3. Germany 
4. Korea 4. Germany 4. UK 4. USA 
5.Germany 5. Austria 5. Switzerland 5. Austria 
6. United States 6. Denmark 6. Korea 6. France and UK 
7. France and Austria 7. Switzerland 7. Austria 7. Korea 
  8. Germany  
 
If we make a global price index based on the above ranking, we find the following sequence, from 
the cheapest country to the most expensive. Parity of purchasing power has been taken into account 
in the original data from the OECD.  
    
1. Denmark 
2. UK, USA and Switzerland 
3. Korea and France 
4. Germany 
5. Austria 
 
If we now list the different actions a regulator can undertake in order to influence end-user prices, 
we find: 
 
Impact of the regulator upon end-user prices 
? Closely monitor wholesale prices 
? Impose price reductions or caps on all telecommunications operators 
? Impose price reductions or caps on the incumbent's services 
? Set up permanent price control mechanism 
 
Intervention on prices can cover several options: price-caps for services comprised in the 
Universal Service Obligation (USO), fixed prices for interconnection and fixed price reductions for all 
telecommunications services. Of course, imposing a price-cap mechanism is generally a decision to 
                                                
23  We take into account the OECD residential tariff basket and the OECD composite basket of residential telephony 
charges, both for August 2002.  
24  We take into account the OECD Internet access basket for 40 hours at daytime respectively evening using discounted 
PSTN rates, both indicators for September 2002.   
25  We take into account the OECD baskets of low/average and high user mobile telephony charges, all indicators for 
August 2002.  
26  We take into account the OECD basket of national leased line charges for August 2002 
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take by the government and not by the regulator, yet it is the task of the regulator to implement such 
policies and in certain cases, to advice the government on possible adaptations of the legislation in 
this regard. Also, the implementation of price regulation policies is partly dependent upon the degree 
to which the regulator exerts surveillance and uses its power of initiation and intervention when need 
arises.  
 
In the outcomes described earlier, we found that Denmark is the cheapest country according to our 
price index. There seems to be a clear link between this result and the Danish government’s motto of 
‘best and cheapest telecommunications services’. Indeed, as a result of this motto, the regulator has 
been very active to promote cheaper prices, in particular via the intervention on wholesale prices.  For 
instance, the regulator systematically imposes price reductions on wholesale products when best 
practice comparisons puts Denmark behind any other country. The regulator also has the task to 
carry out studies based on international comparisons, in order to make sure that the end-user price 
policies are coherent with the results in other liberalized countries. The second cheapest countries in 
our comparison are the United Kingdom, the United States and Switzerland. The positions of the 
United Kingdom and the United States could be explained by the fact that they have a long(er) 
liberalization and regulation history and have thus applied price regulation for a longer time. In the 
United Kingdom, the regulator still maintains fixed price-reductions for all telecommunications 
services. The fact that the incumbents in Denmark, the UK and the USA are totally privatized could 
also have an influence, in the sense that fully privatized operators have less bargaining power and 
political support than (partly) state-owned companies.  
 
Switzerland on the other hand comes as a surprise as far as prices are concerned. Indeed, the 
Swiss liberalization history is concomitant to the EU, the incumbent is still more than 60% state-
owned and the regulator has done very little to sustain price reductions. In many respects, the Swiss 
example thus contradicts the arguments presented before. However, it must not be forgotten that 
Switzerland has the highest purchasing power in the world, and that as a result, the data used for 
calculations may contain a serious bias. If prices were taken without adjustment by means of 
purchasing power, we would find that prices in Switzerland are high compared to other countries. The 
Swiss regulator usually takes this into account by publishing both absolute prices and prices 
converted with purchasing power parity27. According to the regulator’s own saying, comparatively low 
prices for Switzerland are thus mainly the result of high purchasing power.  
 
In the remaining countries including Korea, France, Germany and Austria, price-regulation is 
essentially carried out through price-caps for incumbent’s services and the obligation for the 
incumbent to respect cost-orientation for the delivery of wholesale products. In none of the countries 
there is a specific policy to bring prices down, other than through competition.   
 
All in all, we can conclude that regulatory intervention, underpinned by a clear price regulation 
policy has a high impact on the actual level of prices. However, we cannot exclude that early 
liberalization, full privatization and other external factors also have some effect. 
 
                                                
27  OFCOM, in the future, will publish price comparisons on the basis of exchange rates.  
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External factors affecting end-user prices 
? Date of liberalization ? Purchasing power 
? Full Privatization ? Cartel agreement between operators 
? Consumer response  
 
 
2.2 Outcomes and relative impact of regulatory intervention and external factors 
upon public service indicators 
 
As we have seen before, the other very important objective of regulation is the provision of public 
service, which includes universal service as well as more broadly choices and more appropriate 
information for the consumers. We have not included universal service into our list of indicators but 
decided to observe the availability of services, the quality of services and the quality and amount of 
information given to the consumers.   
 
 
2.2.1 Availability of services 
 
By availability of services, we mean the innovation and rollout of technologies as well as their 
availability on the territory. Unfortunately, data for this indicator are very incomplete; indeed 
sometimes technologies are known to be available but not to which extent, some technologies are still 
in a pilot phase, and sometimes it is impossible to find any information at all. We have used the data 
collected in our case studies and additional data from the OECD Communications Outlook to assess 
the situation in the different countries, but the reader should be warned about the lack of comparability 
of the data.  
 
 A DK F D SK CH UK USA 
Mobile coverage1  99% 100% 99% 99% 99% 99% 98% 97% 
ADSL availability2 80% 
 
100% 72% n.d. 100% 95%6 n.d. 50% 
Network 
digitalization3 
100% 100% 100% 100% 88% 100% 100% 97% 
Cable modem4 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Voice over cable4 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Voice over 
powerline5 
Pilot 
project 
yes no yes n.d. Pilot 
project 
n.d. n.d. 
1 For the year 2001, in OECD Communications Outlook 2003, p. 107; 2 For mid-2002, figures provided by the NRAs; 3 For 
the year 2001, in OECD Communications Outlook 2003, p. 108; 4 Statistics about the availability of cable modem and voice 
over cable could not be found; 5 Power line telephony is a new technology that it still in its testing phase in most countries or 
at the very beginning of commercial launch (Germany). 6 In % of local switches   
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We can conclude from the table above that availability of services is good in all countries 
observed. Digitalization is almost completed in all countries, except in Korea where the high demand 
for DSL connections makes ISDN a priority of second importance. Mobile coverage is good, as is 
ADSL availability. As for cable telephony and cable Internet access, availability is very good in the UK 
(more than 200’000 connections for cable modem and 5.5 million for cable telephony28) and in the 
United States. In Korea, cable modem Internet access is also widespread with more than 3 million 
customers. The Korean case is interesting as the broadband Internet market is much more advanced 
as in all the other countries observed. Indeed, while all the other countries are still focusing their 
attention on ADSL, Korea is turned towards VDSL (20'000 kbps) with an expected 85% of the 
population covered by 2005. As for power line access, it is quite impossible to make statements about 
the respective situations in each country, as this technology is still in a very early development stage.  
 
If we also take into consideration the comments gathered during our interviews, we can conclude 
that technological developments and deployment are especially quick in Korea, in Denmark and to a 
lesser extent in the United States and the United Kingdom. This comes as no surprise, given that 
Korea and Denmark are two countries where technological innovation and R&D are considered to be 
key priorities by the government. The United Kingdom and the United States on the other hand, have 
particularly high availability (and demand) for cable telephony and Internet.   
  
There are some interventions that a regulator can undertake in order to foster the availability of 
services, such as: 
 
Intervention of the regulator on the availability of services 
? Provide legal certainty, which is essential for investments 
? Set targets for the rollout of specific technologies when granting licenses 
? Inform the public more or less about the new technologies available 
? Develop content related initiatives to sustain the demand-side  
 
The intervention of the regulator as far as the availability of services is concerned is quite 
dependent upon governmental policies encouraging technological innovation and deployment. As a 
matter of fact, the regulator has a rather indirect impact on this indicator, i.e. mainly through its 
capacity to provide maximum legal certainty through quick and consistent decision-making, which 
remains the major condition for investment in the sector. Informing the public about available 
technologies and sustaining new technologies through initiatives based on security of use and of 
content are also tasks that the regulator can be responsible for, thus again contributing to the 
availability of services.  
 
From what we can observe in our cases, the impact of the regulator is generally weak when it 
comes to the availability of services, except in South Korea and Denmark, where explicit strategies on 
broadband development or on the deployment of several channels to the home (e.g. Denmark) guide 
                                                
28 OECD, Communications Outlook 2003, pp. 37 and 139 
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the regulator's intervention. The presence or not of a government strategy in the area of technological 
development and the consequent powers conferred to the regulator are thus major elements behind 
the impact of the regulator.  
 
As an external factor, the financial health of the operators constitutes a very important condition for 
the rollout of technologies, and although the regulator can have an indirect impact thereon, the 
financial health of telecommunications operators is much more determined by the situation of the 
stock market and the international strategies of global operators. Other external factors are the 
geographic characteristics of the country and consumer responsiveness to technological innovation.  
 
 
External factors affecting the availability of services 
? International economic situation 
? Topography of the country and population density 
? Dynamism of telecommunications operators 
? International strategies 
 
All in all, it seems that the role of the regulator with respect to the availability of services is weak, 
except for countries in which there is a very pro-active policy on innovation and R & D. However, 
even those countries are conditioned by the financial situation of the operators which may delay the 
planned rollout of certain technologies.   
 
 
2.2.2 Quality of services 
  
In OECD countries, the quality of communication services is good and differences between 
countries are very slight. From our interviews, we got the impression that quality is indeed good in all 
of our 8 countries, although some governments seem to take quality monitoring more serious than 
others (notably South Korea, Denmark, the United States and the United Kingdom). However, this 
subjective impression was not confirmed with actual data in our case studies.   
 
Some data on quality of services can be found in the OECD’s Communications Outlook. The 
OECD has attempted to measure the quality of services by means of a series of indicators, including 
the waiting time to get a connection, the number of payphones per 1000 inhabitants and the number 
of payphones in working order, network defaults and repair time, the price for directory assistance and 
the answer seize ratios (ratio of international calls that are successfully terminated in the public 
switched networks of operators of other countries).29 
  
                                                
29 The methodology behind these indicators can be found in OECD, Communications Outlook 2003.  
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If we rank the countries according to the indicators mentioned above we find:   
 
# payphones per 
1000 inhabitants1  
% of payphones 
in working order2 
Faults per 100 
lines per year4 
% of faults 
repaired in 24 
hours5 
Directory 
assistance in 
USD PPP6 
Answer seizure 
ratio in %7 
Korea (11.4) Austria (98.2) Denmark (0)  Korea (96.8) USA (0) DK (68.4) 
USA (6.7) CH (98) Korea (1.4)  CH (94) Korea (0.06) France (67.8) 
CH (5.6) UK (94.6) Austria (5.2) Austria (90.4) UK (0.58) USA (67.4) 
France (3.6) Korea (91) UK (11) UK (78) Austria (0.71) Austria (65.9) 
Austria (3.3) DK (90) USA (12) n.d. France (0.91) Korea (65.5) 
UK (2.6) n.d. CH (16) n.d. CH (1.09) UK (64.3) 
D (1.4) n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. CH (62.7) 
DK(1.1) n.d n.d.  n.d. n.d.  D (61.8) 
1 OECD Communications Outlook, 2003, p. 199; 2 OECD Communications Outlook, 2003, p. 200, no data available for 
France, Germany and the United States; 3 OECD Communications Outlook, 2003, p. 198; 4  OECD Communications 
Outlook, 2003, p. 201, no data available for France and Germany; 5 OECD Communications Outlook, 2003, p. 202-203, no 
data available for France, Germany, the United States, and Denmark; 6 OECD Communications Outlook, 2003, p. 204-205, 
no data available for Denmark and Germany; 7 OECD Communications Outlook, 2003, p. 206 
 
All in all, if we combine all these factors without weighing their importance and without taking into 
consideration the fact that data are not available for all countries for each indicator, we find that in 
terms of quality of services, Korea comes first, followed by the USA, Austria, France, Denmark, the 
United Kingdom, Switzerland, and finally Germany.  
 
If we list the different actions a regulator can undertake in order to guarantee the quality of 
services, we find: 
 
Intervention of the regulator on the quality of services 
? Define quality standards for USO/other services 
? Test services, such as directory inquiries or value-added services 
? Test the quality of customer relation within the companies 
? In case of deficiency, the regulator can or cannot impose sanctions 
? Publish performances of the operators by means of a favorable status list, for 
instance 
? Develop quality measurement tools for consumers 
? Make public inquiries about the available quality 
 
The regulator can play a very active role in this field, through a whole series of measures. First of 
all, the regulator can set quality standards for the telecommunications services but also for the 
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relationship between operators and their clients. The monitoring of these standards and the 
appropriate sanctioning in case of non-compliance are in this respect, at least as important as the 
standard definition itself. The degree to which the regulator informs the consumer about the quality of 
services or provides them with quality measurement tools is yet another field where the regulator can 
promote good quality services. 
 
There seems to be a relation between the intervention of regulators and the actual quality of 
services in a country, as shown in the cases of Korea and the United States. However, establishing 
an undisputable link between regulatory intervention and improved quality of services is hazardous 
with the data that we have in our possession. For instance, according to our ranking, the UK is not 
among the most performing country in terms of quality, at least when looking at our indicators, 
although the British regulator was found to be rather active in this field. France on the other hand has 
a good score, although we did not get the impression, through our interviews that much attention was 
given to this aspect of regulation. It would be worthwhile to have more detailed information on quality 
of services, and chronological series for all countries. Indeed, some countries do not provide data for 
all the indicators taken into account. Starting from there, one could also argue that when there are no 
data available for an indicator in a country, the regulator does not sufficiently monitor quality. In 
France for instance, data can only be found for 4 indicators out of seven presented above. Only 
Korea, Switzerland, Austria and the United Kingdom have information for all indicators.  
 
External factors affecting the quality of services could be the costumer orientation of the 
enterprises themselves, the quality of the initial network inherited from the monopolistic era, and the 
topography in the country.  
 
External factors affecting the quality of services 
? Level of maintenance 
? Customer orientation of telecommunications operators 
? Topography 
 
However, all things considered, the regulator seems to have a great role to play to ensure quality 
of services and consumer satisfaction, and this role is taken very seriously in countries such as the 
United States, Korea and Denmark.  
 
 
2.2.3 Information to the consumer 
 
The provision of information to the consumers does not seem to be a priority in all of the countries 
observed in this study. In continental Europe, for instance, responsibility is left to the consumers to 
find out about new offers and possibilities. Regulators rely on the operators to advertise their offers 
and new services made possible through regulatory intervention (such as number portability or carrier 
selection for instance). In the United States, the United Kingdom, and Denmark, on the other hand, 
we found that informing the consumer was considered as an important objective of regulation. In the 
context of this study however, we did not have the means to verify the extent to which consumers are 
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actually informed with or without regulatory intervention, but it would certainly be an interesting 
exercise.  
 
The different actions a regulator can undertake in order to promote the information offered to the 
public are listed below:  
 
Intervention of the regulator on the quality of services 
? Make information permanently available 
? Update information regularly 
? Put more or less information online 
? Decide on the amount and the quality of the information 
? Answer questions from the public more or less rapidly 
? Provide information about prices of telecom services 
? Provide information about the quality of telecom services 
? Have a more or less friendly and efficient customer relation service 
 
As far as informing the public is concerned, we saw that it has become an important function of the 
regulator, once the liberalized market witnessed the mushrooming of new features, offers, and 
services. The impact of the regulator on this indicator could theoretically be strong, as there are not 
many external factors impeding its actions. However, here again the impact of the regulator strongly 
depends on the powers and means that are conferred to it by the legislator. Among the countries we 
observed, the Danish regulator seems to take on this role the most actively. Indeed, the Danish 
regulator informs the Danes about available technologies, about the offers of the operators, and has 
also developed an interactive price guide for consumers who wish to know how much they actually 
could pay for specific services. Furthermore, the Danish regulator is obligated to answer any 
consumer demand within a period of 5 days, and has extensive personnel in its customer division. In 
other countries, we have found that there is still significant room for improvement with regards to 
information for the consumer, something which is especially true for Switzerland, France, and 
Germany. In these countries, the regulators are not properly empowered with the function of 
informing the consumers, a task which is often left to private organizations. 
 
As mentioned before, in the context of this study, we could not compare the actual outcomes of 
this indicator, i.e., verify whether the information provided by the regulator is useful, used and yields 
actual benefits fro the consumer. As a consequence, we can only affirm that the information of the 
regulator can be crucial, but not that without regulatory intervention there is an information deficiency 
for the consumer. Factors on which the only regulator has little impact are the consumer awareness 
in the country, reputed to be strong is Scandinavian countries for instance, and the extent to which 
private operators or private organizations inform the consumer.    
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External factors affecting the information to the consumer 
? Consumer awareness 
? Information given by private organizations / consumer associations 
? Advertising of the companies  
 
All in all, we can say that the regulator has an important role to play as far as information to the 
consumer is concerned, as in the end, the regulator is also supposed to be the guardian of the 
consumer’s interests within the process of telecom liberalization. This view is not shared by all 
countries though, where responsibilities for informing are left to the companies and to private 
organizations.  
 
 
2.3 Summary 
 
If we summarize the paragraphs above in a table reflecting the respective impacts of regulatory 
intervention and external factors on all seven indicators, we find the following: 
 
Indicators Prevailing impact 
# of operators on the markets External factors 
Market shares of incumbent External factors and regulatory intervention 
Choices for the consumers External factors and regulatory intervention 
Availability of services External factors and regulatory intervention 
End-user prices Regulatory intervention 
Quality of services Regulatory intervention 
Information to the consumer Regulatory intervention 
 
Overall, it appears that the impact of the regulator is potentially higher in public service objectives, 
than in the case of competition creation objectives. This is of course quite logical, considering the fact 
that competition significantly depends upon macro-economic factors (such as the overall economic 
climate, global cartelization), as well as on other actors within the overall telecommunications 
regulatory framework (e.g., competition authority). 
 
Although the above conclusions apply to all regulators, there are still differences to be made 
between the countries taken into account. For those indicators on which the regulator can make a real 
difference, we have summarized the findings of our case studies below. More precisely, for the 3 
indicators upon which the regulator can have a strong impact (end-user prices, quality of services and 
information to the consumer) and the other 3 upon which the regulator can have some impact (market 
shares of the incumbent, choice for the consumers and availability of services) we have refined the 
analysis per country. 
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For each category of indicator, we have observed that the national regulator can either have a 
“weak”, an “average”, or a “strong” impact. When a regulator is said to have a weak impact on a given 
outcome or indicator, we mean that the intervention of the regulator is not determinant for the final 
result or outcome. An average impact means that the regulator has a certain influence on the 
indicator, but that it is limited by a whole series of institutional and external factors. When a regulator 
is said to have a strong impact on a given indicator, his actions are determining and can significantly 
change the characteristics of the telecom market (and public services). However, the reader must 
understand that when a regulator is said to have a weak impact on a given indicator, this does not 
necessarily mean that the regulator himself is weak, but that its freedom of action is either limited by 
other institutions, by law, or by external, and other uncontrollable factors.30  
 
Thus, looking at the six indicators upon which the regulator can have some impact, we see that the 
respective impacts of the national regulators in our countries are: 
 
 
Impact of the 
regulator on ... 
Austria Denmark France Germany South 
Korea 
Switzer-
land 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Market shares 
of incumbent 
        
Choices for the 
consumers 
        
Availability of 
services 
        
 
End-user prices 
 
        
Quality of 
services 
        
Information to 
the consumer 
        
 
 Weak  Average  Strong 
 
As we can see, there can be significant differences from one country to another with regards to the 
impact of the regulator on the different indicators. This table also reflects the results of the previous 
                                                
30  The reader must keep in mind that the information underlying the statements expressed in the table is drawn from the 
case studies, and that the impact of the regulator on any given indicator is always relative to the other countries 
observed. In other words, there is no ranking against any best practice or any best country. We simply compare 
regulatory intervention against the lists of interventions by the regulator used in the preceding analysis. These lists have 
been furthermore established by us, i.e., as a result of our empirical observations, and does not reflect international 
standards. It could, however, constitute a check-list for possible regulatory intervention, and we use it as such. 
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section, which concluded that, potentially, the regulator could have a more significant impact upon the 
public services outcomes than on the competition outcomes.  
 
Overall, and across all countries, it appears that the impact of the regulator on some indicators is 
more substantial than on others, as shown in the list below, ranking from the most to the least 
substantial impact. 
 
1. Impact upon the quality of services 
2. Impact upon end-user prices 
3. Impact upon the information to consumers  
4. Impact upon the choices for the consumers 
5. Impact upon the market shares of the incumbent 
6. Impact upon the availability of services 
 
If one compares, across all the indicators, the impact of the regulator on the outcomes in the eight 
different countries, the following ranking can be established: 
 
1. Denmark 
2. United Kingdom 
3. South Korea 
4. United States 
5. Austria and France 
6. Germany and Switzerland 
 
Quite obviously, the degree to which a regulator impacts the outcomes is dependent upon certain 
factors, which are of course again different from one country to another. One can distinguish between 
four such factors, namely the substantial legal framework, external factors, the efficiency of the 
regulator and the institutional legal framework and subsequent institutional regulatory arrangements. 
Let us briefly look at each of them. 
 
The substantial legal framework determines the public policies objectives. For obvious reasons, 
the regulator can have an impact only when such public policies objectives exist. From our analysis, 
we concluded that the broad public policy objectives are similar across all eight countries studied, yet 
with two caveats: first, early liberalizers seem to be more effective in fostering competition than late 
liberalizers, which tends to indicate that (1) the timing of public (telecommunications) policy matters, 
and that (2) the regulator does learn, at least in the area of competition promotion. Secondly, some 
countries do have technology innovation and R&D policies, which positively affect consumer 
protection objectives. 
 
There is also the question of external factors, which are per definition out of the regulator’s control. 
From our analysis, we deduce that external factors are more significant when it comes to competition 
regulatory objectives than when it comes to public services objectives. 
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There is also the issue of the efficiency of the regulator. Indeed, even if the public policy 
objectives are clearly stated and the regulator finds itself in the center of the institutional regulatory 
framework and is given competence, power, and resources, it can fail to impact upon the outcomes 
because it works poorly and inefficiently. The issue of efficiency is not relevant in the framework of the 
present study, which is why we will not address the matter any further here.   
 
The institutional legal framework and corresponding institutional regulatory arrangements are yet 
another, in our view very significant factor, determining the impact of the regulator on the outcomes. 
Where the objectives of liberalization and regulation are clearly defined and the regulator is located in 
the center of the system and given power and resources, the chances that the regulator effectively 
contributes to the achievement of the defined outcomes are naturally higher (as it is the case in 
Denmark and the United Kingdom). But when the institutional regulatory arrangement is less 
coherent, the impact of the regulator will naturally be less significant. This is the analysis we will 
provide in the section below. It will specifically seek to assess the status of the regulator within the 
overall institutional regulatory framework. 
 
2.4 Role of the institutional regulatory framework in determining the impact of the 
sectoral regulator on outcomes  
 
We have seen above that the regulator can have a strong, average of weak impact upon the 
outcomes of telecom regulation. In this section, we exclusively focus on one of the above four factors 
having an influence on such an impact, namely the question of the institutional regulatory framework. 
As noted earlier, the design of this institutional framework does have a very significant influence upon 
the overall performance of the regulator (i.e. upon the impact it can have or not have in achieving the 
regulatory outcomes), as it defines the status and the power of the regulator, as well as its 
relationships with the other actors of the framework. In other words, in this section, we try to 
understand why in some countries the regulator seems to have a more significant impact upon the 
outcomes than in others. 
 
If one assumes that the external factors are more or less identical in all eight countries, that all 
regulators work with a similar degree of efficiency, and that the public policies objectives are also 
more or less identical, the main explanatory factor for this difference in impact has to origin in the 
institutional regulatory framework. Ideally of course, the objectives of telecom regulation should be 
clear and the competencies of the different involved actors, in particular of the sector regulator, 
precisely defined, in order to guarantee maximum coherence and stability of the institutional 
regulatory framework. However, when we look at the different case studies, we can note that there 
are sometimes serious institutional flaws in the regulatory framework, which prevent the overall 
system from yielding optimal results. Among such flaws one may note the struggle for power among 
the involved actors, competition for 'clients', overlapping or poorly defined tasks, contradictory political 
objectives and attributions, as well as a lack of cooperation between the different actors involved in 
telecom regulation. As the most obvious indicator of such institutional flaws – i.e., the way these 
institutional flaws are expressed – one may take the degree of conflict (or tension) among the 
involved actors. As we are interested in the performance of the regulator, we will in particular examine 
the degree of conflictuality between the regulator and the main other actors involved in the 
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institutional framework (i.e., judicial powers, sponsoring ministry, competition authority, incumbent, 
and competitors).31 In other words, we are using here the “degree of conflictuality” between the 
regulator and the other main actors as the key indicator defining the performance of the regulator 
within this framework.  
 
To determine the degree of conflictuality in our different countries, we relied on the interviews that 
we conducted with each one of the actors involved in the regulatory system in each country. The 
drawback of such as method is that the information provided is highly subjective, and that the 
interviewed representatives may precisely not be representative of the most shared opinion. The 
advantages of this approach on the other hand, are that we could capture the sometimes 
contradicting opinions of the different stakeholders and that the rather informal nature of our visits 
encouraged our interviewees to speak openly.    
 
From what we learned through our interviews, we classified institutional tensions in a comparative 
manner, distinguishing between low, medium, and high tensions between the regulator on the one 
hand and all other main involved actors in the institutional regulatory framework for 
telecommunications on the other. 
 
 Austria Denmark France Germany South 
Korea 
Switzer 
land 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Institutional 
tensions between 
        
Regulator and 
judicial powers 
        
Regulator and 
ministry 
        
Regulator and 
comp. authority 
        
Regulator and 
incumbent 
        
Regulator and 
competitors 
        
 
 
 Low  Medium  High 
 
An analysis of this table indicates that there are significant differences among the eight countries 
when it comes to the degree of conflictuality between the regulator and the other main actors involved 
                                                
31  In the case of Switzerland, where we have two bodies making up for the “regulator”, we will not distinguish between the 
ComCom on the one hand and the part of the OFCOM which is executing telecommunications regulation, thus implicitly 
assuming that there are no conflicts among these two bodies (which, to our knowledge, is the case). 
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in telecommunications regulation. One may rank the countries from the least conflictual to the most 
conflictual: 
 
Conflictuality in increasing order Reminder: Impact of the regulator in 
decreasing order 
1. Denmark and Austria 1. Denmark 
2. United Kingdom 2. United Kingdom 
3. France 3. South Korea 
4. South Korea and Switzerland 4. United States 
5. United States 5. Austria and France 
6. Germany 6. Germany and Switzerland 
 
There appears to be a certain correlation between the degree of conflictuality on the one hand and 
the impact of the regulator on the outcomes on the other, especially in the case of the extremes: the 
country where the degree of conflictuality is minimal is also the country where the regulator seems to 
have the most significant impact on the outcomes of telecommunications regulation (e.g., Denmark 
and the United Kingdom). On the other hand, where the degree of conflictuality is maximum, the 
regulator also appears to have the least impact upon the outcomes (e.g., mainly Germany, but to a 
lesser degree also Switzerland). There are, however, exceptions, namely the United States and South 
Korea – where the regulator has a certain impact despite a relatively high degree of conflictuality – on 
the one hand, and Austria on the other, where there is little impact of the regulator despite a low 
degree of conflictuality. The low degree of conflictuality in Austria is essentially attributable to two 
factors: first of all, until July 2002 there was no competition authority, the function of regulating 
competition was left to the ministry. Secondly, the low degree of conflictuality between the regulator 
and the judicial powers is essentially due to the judicial power’s slowness. Indeed, out of 120 cases 
pending before court since 1998, only 3 were ruled on. In actual fact, conflictuality is still low, but this 
situation could change if the courts were to rule on a whole series of pending cases. The US and 
South Korean exceptions, must, in our view, be attributed to the substantial policies (on consumer 
protection and technology innovation), which give the regulator additional roles to play. 
 
We can conclude from the above that the way the institutional regulatory framework is set up 
significantly affects the outcomes of regulation, and in particular the performance of the regulator. 
Inter-organizational tensions often reflect weaknesses in the legislation itself, which is often not clear 
enough, especially when it comes to the division of competencies among the different actors. Also, 
legislation does sometimes not grant enough power to those institutions that should be primarily 
involved in the telecom regulation, i.e. the NRA. This can be the result of a deliberate decision aimed 
at limiting the powers of certain institutions, in particular the regulator, but it can also result from the 
fact that legislation could not predict the evolution of the market and the regulatory needs.  
 
Overall, one observes that there is significant tension, in order of importance, between the 
regulator and the incumbent, between the regulator and the judicial powers, between the regulator 
and the competition authority, between the regulator and the sponsoring ministry, and finally between 
the regulator and the competitors. The assumption is made here that such tensions diminish the 
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regulator’s overall performance – i.e., the impact of the regulator on the outcomes. This assumption 
may not be true, especially in the case of the tension between the regulator and the incumbent (and 
to a lesser extent between the regulator and the competitors). Nevertheless, the inverse correlation 
between regulatory performance and the degree of conflictuality within the overall institutional 
framework remains, even if one removes the regulator’s relationships with the incumbent and the 
competitors. If a certain conflictuality between the regulator and the operators seems to be normal – 
or even necessary for a regulator to succeed – conflictuality with the judicial powers, the competition 
authority, and even the sponsoring ministry appears to be rather counter-productive. We are facing 
here the fact that (1) there is indeed no optimal institutional regulatory framework, and that (2) this 
regulatory institutional framework still strongly reflects the political and institutional history of a given 
country. In other words, a certain conflictuality – negatively impacting upon the performance of the 
regulator – will always exist between the regulator and the judicial authorities, as well as between the 
sector regulator and the competition regulator. Therefore the performance of the sector regulator will 
always be sub-optimal, no matter how good the institutional regulatory design. However, the tension 
between the sector regulator and the sponsoring ministry is generally due to the fact that one of the 
operators in the marker – i.e., the incumbent – remains publicly owned, and this tension will ultimately 
only disappear with total privatization.  
 
Finally, and as we have seen, the degree of conflictuality – influencing significantly the 
performance of the sector regulator – strongly varies from one country to another. It is interesting to 
observe that it is highest in federalist countries (Germany, United States, Switzerland), again with 
Austria being an exception. This is not surprising, as federalist countries are known to have a strong 
culture of separation of powers and check-and-balances. Powers and competencies are therefore 
more often split between several institutions, which involves potentially higher conflictuality32. In other 
words, the performance of the regulator seems to be somewhat diminished because of the type of the 
political system, as well as because of public ownership of the incumbent. 
 
                                                
32 See Genoud C., Arentsen M., Finger M., Section on Regulation in Midttun, A. (eds) Reshaping EU electricity and gas 
industries : regulation, markets and business strategies, forthcoming autumn 2003, Elsevier, Amsterdam.  
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3 Conclusion  
 
To recall, the purpose of this study was to assess the relative impact of the sector regulator as 
compared to the outcomes. More precisely, we wanted to respond to three main questions, namely: 
 
• To what extent have the original public policy objectives in the telecommunications sector been 
achieved? 
• To what extent can these outcomes be attributed to the regulatory institutional framework as 
opposed to external factors, beyond the control of the NRA and other institutional regulatory 
actors (e.g., economic growth or technological innovation)? 
• Wherever the role of the external factors is small, to what extent, then, can the outcomes of the 
regulatory framework be attributed to the specific actions of the sector regulator, i.e., the 
NRA? 
 
Overall, we can affirm that the objectives of telecom regulation have been partly achieved in all of 
our countries, and that the current frameworks for regulation have proved to be effective. Of course, 
there are some differences from one country to another; in particular regarding the objective of 
competition. Indeed, countries such as the USA, the UK and Denmark have reached higher levels of 
competition whereas the rest of continental Europe and Korea still have very dominant incumbent 
operators. Still, there is no country among the ones observed in the context of this study, which has 
failed to achieve at least a major part of its telecommunications objectives.  
 
However, one can see that the impact of the regulator upon the outcomes varies to some extent 
from country to country. It appears to be most significant, in decreasing order of importance, in (1) 
Denmark, (2) the United Kingdom, (3) South Korea, (4) the United States, (5) Austria and France, 
and finally Germany and Switzerland. This varying impact can be explained, according to our study, 
by four factors, namely (a) the degree of conflictuality within the existing institutional framework, (b) 
the timing of liberalization, (c) the specific aspects to be regulated, and (d) the original 
telecommunications legislation. Let us look at each of these factors in more detail.  
 
One can say that the institutional framework for telecommunications regulation does matter. 
Indeed, we can affirm that, in general, the more the institutional framework bears conflict, the less 
impact the regulator has on the outcomes. We have identified such conflict, across the different 
countries, in order of decreasing importance, between the regulator and the incumbent, between the 
regulator and the judicial powers, between the regulator and the competition authority, between the 
regulator and the sponsoring ministry, and finally between the regulator and the competitors. But this 
degree of conflictuality strongly varies from one country to another: it is strongest in the federalist 
countries of Germany, the United States, and Switzerland, which are also these countries where 
impacts of the regulator on regulatory outcomes are weakest. On the other hand, the least conflictual 
country, Denmark, is also the country in which the regulator has the highest impact. From there, we 
can conclude that the impact of the regulator on telecommunications objectives is potentially highest 
when:  
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1. Competencies have been clearly defined and shared out among the different institutions 
2. Within the institutional framework, the legitimacy of one institution is not questioned by other 
institutions, in particular the regulator’s action by the competition authority, the juridical power 
or even the sponsoring ministry.  
3. The regulator is given sufficient means and powers to face conflicts with the Incumbent 
operator, especially in those countries where the Incumbent is still partly state-owned, and 
where there (can) exist conflicting interests at political level  
 
We can also affirm that the timing of liberalization does matter: the earlier liberalization has 
occurred, the bigger the impact of the regulator on the outcomes. This is particularly the case of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent Denmark. Of course, this can be explained 
by the fact that the regulator will have had time to learn. At the same time, the market also ‘learns’ or 
at least evolves towards more solid competition. In particular, alternative operators have started to 
make profits and in some cases, resolved their debts problems.  
 
Thirdly, it appears clearly that the impact of the regulator upon the outcomes varies considerably 
according to the type of aspect to be regulated. Overall, one can distinguish between competition and 
public service objectives. As a matter of fact, it appears that regulation is less effective in achieving 
competition outcomes than it is in achieving public service outcomes. Indeed, in the area of public 
service, the regulator can have a strong impact, provided there is according legislation on its role as a 
promoter of public service objectives. On the other hand, as far as competition is concerned, factors 
beyond the control of the regulator do play a quite significant role in the achievement of the final 
outcomes. From our observation, we conclude that downstream, the regulator’s action is primordial to 
create the appropriate conditions for competition to emerge. In an asymmetric market such as the 
telecommunications market, regulatory intervention is indeed a sine qua non condition to even make 
competition possible. Upstream however, macro-economic factors weigh heavily on the final degree 
of competition within the market. Therefore, the intervention of the regulator is essential, but the final 
results that can be expected can only partly be attributed to regulatory intervention. From there, we 
can assume that:  
 
1. The regulator can have a strong impact on public service objectives, in particular on 
consumer protection and information 
2. The action of the regulator is a prerequisite for competition to be made possible, but the 
final degree of competition that is to be observed does not only depend upon regulatory 
intervention 
 
Finally, it must be recalled, that legislation does indeed matter: telecommunications regulators, as 
all other regulators, can only be as effective, as the legislator wants them to be. In particular, if the 
legislator does not want one aspect to be regulated, the regulator cannot become active and its 
impact upon the outcomes can actually not be judged. In particular, countries, which do have pro-
active policies for consumer protection and/or technology innovation and R&D policies, positively 
affect public service objectives. Thus the following conclusions:  
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1. Regulatory intervention is best where policy objectives and according legislation have been 
clearly defined and responsibilities clearly attributed  
2. Legislative fuzziness only leads to conflictuality within the institutional framework and in 
particular, to the undermining of the regulator’s legitimacy and credibility 
 
If we look back at the Swiss case in light of the remarks made above, the main challenges of future 
telecommunications regulation are: 
 
1. A more precise legislative framework in which the regulator’s competencies cannot be 
systematically questioned, either by the incumbent, or worse, by the judicial powers. Indeed, 
dissolving regulatory power among several actors when attributing powers, besides to the 
regulator (both the ComCom and the OFCOM), also to the judicial power, to the competition 
authority, as well as to price surveillance, ultimately leads to challenging the credibility of the 
regulator. More precisely, it leads to reducing its bargaining power vis-à-vis the operators 
that it is supposed to regulate, and especially vis-à-vis the Incumbent. We may compare the 
Swiss case to the situation of Denmark or the United Kingdom, for example, where the 
regulator (and not the sponsoring Ministry as is sometimes the case in Switzerland) is 
considered to be the most important actor of the telecom regulation institutional framework, 
and where regulatory objectives have been clearly laid down. There, the regulator knows its 
limits and uses them to implement the public policy objectives without being constantly put 
under pressure and accused of overstepping its competencies (as is the case with the Swiss 
regulator). As a result, the operators have a different attitude vis-à-vis the regulator, and the 
Incumbents do not systematically appeal the regulator’s decisions.   
 
2. The empowerment of the regulator in the field of public service objectives. Indeed, if in 
Switzerland, the regulator’s main role pertains to creating and sustaining competition 
(without however, giving it all the necessary means to do so, as seen above), in many of the 
countries observed however, the regulator also provides significant and useful support to the 
consumers. In doing so, the regulator does play a key role, if not the key role, in providing 
the benefits of liberalization for the consumers, which is in the end, the major and ultimate 
objective of liberalization and regulation. Especially in Denmark, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and South Korea, consumer focus is strong and explicit and the work of the 
regulator in terms of information and support to the consumer is considered as a national 
priority. Furthermore, and as we have seen in our study consumer protection is also the area 
where a regulator is ultimately most effective, i.e., where it can most significantly influence 
the outcomes. Of course, in Switzerland, the law is, to a certain extent, concerned with 
consumer interests, but it does not see this a priority, nor does the currently existing 
institutional regulatory framework attribute the regulator the means to play a particularly 
significant role in protecting the consumers’ interests.  
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